%0 Journal Article %T On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard %+ Control, Optimization, Models, Methods and Applications for Nonlinear Dynamical Systems (Commands) %+ Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO) %A Martinon, Pierre %A Picard, Pierre %A Raj, Anasuya %< avec comité de lecture %@ 1554-964X %J Geneva Risk and Insurance Review %I Palgrave Macmillan %V 43 %N 2 %P 137-185 %8 2018-07 %D 2018 %R 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y %K optimal control %K health insurance %K ex post moral hazard %K audit %K background risk %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJournal articles %X We analyze the design of optimal medical insurance under ex post moral haz-ard, i.e., when illness severity cannot be observed by insurers and policyholdersdecide for themselves on their health expenditures. The trade-o¤ between exante risk sharing and ex post incentive compatibility is analyzed in an optimalrevelation mechanism under hidden information and risk aversion. The optimalcontract provides partial insurance at the margin, with a deductible when in-surers’ rates are affected by a positive loading, and it may also include an upperlimit on coverage. The potential to audit the health state leads to an upper limiton out-of-pocket expenses. %G English %2 https://polytechnique.hal.science/hal-01348551v3/document %2 https://polytechnique.hal.science/hal-01348551v3/file/Martinon-Picard-Raj-GRIR2018-preprint.pdf %L hal-01348551 %U https://polytechnique.hal.science/hal-01348551 %~ SHS %~ X %~ CNRS %~ INRIA %~ INRIA-SACLAY %~ AO-ECONOMIE %~ X-CMAP %~ X-DEP %~ X-DEP-MATHA %~ INRIA_TEST %~ TESTALAIN1 %~ CMAP %~ INRIA2 %~ UNIV-PARIS-SACLAY %~ INRIA-SACLAY-2015 %~ X-SACLAY %~ GS-COMPUTER-SCIENCE %~ INRIAARTDOI