%0 Unpublished work %T Splitting Risks in Insurance Markets In Adverse Selection %+ École polytechnique (X) %A Picard, Pierre %8 2017-01-22 %D 2017 %K Insurance %K adverse selection %K contract %K health insurance %K copayment %K deductible %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinancePreprints, Working Papers, ... %X We characterize the design of insurance schemes when policyhold- ers face several insurable risks in a context of adverse selection. Split- ting risks emerges as a feature of second-best Pareto-optimal alloca- tions. This may take the form of risk-specic contracts, or of con- tracts where risks are bundled, but subject to di⁄erential coverage rules such as risk specic copayments, combined with a deductible, an out-of-pocket maximum or a cap on coverage. %G English %2 https://polytechnique.hal.science/hal-01448322v1/document %2 https://polytechnique.hal.science/hal-01448322v1/file/Cahier%20n%C2%B0%202016-20_PICARD.pdf %L hal-01448322 %U https://polytechnique.hal.science/hal-01448322